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The reliability of EMU’s fiscal indicators has been questioned by recent episodes of large 
upward deficit revisions. This paper discusses the causes of such revisions in order to identify 
ways  to  improve  monitoring.  The  computation  of  EMU’s  deficit  indicator  involves  the 
assessment  of  accrued  revenue  and  expenditure  and  the  identification  of  transactions  in 
financial assets. Both can open margins for opportunistic accounting. However, crosschecks 
between deficit and changes in gross nominal debt (the other fiscal indicator used in EMU) can 
reduce the scope for window dressing. Simple comparison of deficit and changes in debt can 
readily spotlight large inconsistencies in fiscal data. Nevertheless, consistency checks must go 
deeper than simple comparison, since different items in the reconciliation account between 
deficit and change in debt can offset each other. Econometric  evidence suggests that such 
offset may indeed have been used to reduce the visibility of deficit-specific window dressing. 
Attention to the quality of statistics has increased in recent years, also in the context of the 
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. In this context, the paper argues that detailed analysis 
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1. Introduction
1 
The effectiveness of any fiscal rule crucially depends on the indicators to which it is geared. 
The indicators should be resilient to manipulation and opportunistic exploitation.  
 
EMU fiscal rules rely on yearly targets set in terms of traditional indicators of deficit and debt. 
Continued compliance with these targets is expected to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. 
Arguably,  reference  to  forward-looking  indicators  would  have  been  more  appropriate. 
However, such indicators require complex computations, often relying on strong assumptions, 
and do not lend themselves to be adopted for the enforcement of formal rules, especially in a 
multinational  context  where  moral  hazard  issues  gain  prominence  (Balassone  and  Franco, 
2000). 
 
Having dismissed sophisticated indicators for the sake of effective monitoring, the expectation 
is  that  EMU  fiscal  indicators  should  score  high  in  terms  of  reliability.  However,  recent 
episodes of large upward deficit revisions suggest that this is not always the case. 
 
The paper acknowledges that all fiscal indicators can be manipulated. Therefore, replacing 
current indicators with new ones would not solve the problem. By highlighting the weak spots 
of EMU fiscal indicators, the paper aims at identifying ways to improve monitoring. 
 
The paper points out that EMU’s deficit indicator is particularly fragile in two respects.
2 First, 
since it measures net borrowing, it draws a line between transactions in financial and non-
financial assets, with the latter alone being considered in the computation of deficits. But the 
distinction between financial and non-financial transactions is not clear-cut, and the available 
margins of interpretation can be used opportunistically.
3 Second, EMU’s deficit indicator is 
measured on an accrual basis, relying on estimates which are by their nature subject to an 
element of subjective evaluation.
4 
                                                 
1  The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not commit Banca d’Italia. We thank Marco 
Buti, Joao Nogueira Martins and Alessandro Turrini for kindly making available to us the dataset used for 
their 2006 paper. We thank Joao Nogueira Martins also for his valuable discussion of the paper and the 
participants to the European Commission workshop on “Fiscal indicators in the EU budgetary surveillance” 
for useful suggestions. Finally, we are grateful to Roberto Golinelli and two anonymous referees for their 
helpful comments. 
2   There is  also  an issue  concerning  the  definition  of the  public  sector  whose  deficit  and  debt have  to  be 
considered (see Balassone, Franco, and Zotteri, 2006).  
3  This problem is similar to the one arising in the application of the “golden rule”, where the deficit measure 
should only take into account current transactions and exclude capital ones (see Balassone and Franco, 2001).    
4  Cash-based deficit measures are by no means exempt form the risk of manipulation. However, contrary to 
what happens with accrual estimates, manipulation of cash figures obtained by postponing payments and/or 
demanding anticipated payments find a natural limit in the voice of the interested counterparts.     
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Partly reflecting concerns over these fragilities, since 1994 EU member states are required to 
provide the European Commission with a reconciliation account between deficit figures and 
the corresponding change in debt, the latter being a good proxy of the cash gross borrowing 
(Balassone, Franco, and Zotteri, 2006). Moreover, when reliance on accrual accounting within 
the European System of Accounts (ESA) increased (with the switch from the 1979 to the 1995 
version  of  the  system),  Eurostat  specified  that  revenue  computed  in  accrual  terms  should 
include only those items that are likely to be actually cashed in and that over the medium-term 
accrual and cash data should converge.
5 
 
However, in the implementation of the Excessive deficit procedure relatively little effort was 
put  in  the  analysis  of  consistency  between  deficit  and  debt  data,  thus  failing  to  exploit 
synergies arising in the joint monitoring of EMU fiscal rules. The problem is witnessed by the 
tolerance  exerted  by  European  institutions  towards  member  states  submitting  incomplete 
reconciliation accounts. It is probably a consequence of the failure to give operational content 
to the debt rule, and the subsequent focus on the deficit rule.
6  
 
The paper argues that even simply comparing deficits with changes in debt can help the early 
detection of inconsistencies in fiscal data. Indeed, changes in general government debt were 
much larger than initial deficit figures in Greece, Italy and Portugal before the large upward 
deficit revisions experienced in recent years. 
 
Nevertheless, the paper points out that consistency checks between deficits and changes in debt 
must go deeper than the overall difference between the two indicators. Since different items in 
the reconciliation account (henceforth, SFA for stock-flow adjustments) can offset each other, 
an underestimated deficit does not necessarily imply a large discrepancy between deficit and 
change in debt. 
 
The paper presents a simple model of the incentives to resort to window dressing under EMU 
deficit and debt rules, based on the partition of SFA into two groups.
7 One group includes 
items that can be used to affect the Maastricht deficit but leave the change in debt unaltered (a 
“deficit-specific” SFA), the other includes items that can be used to reduce the change in debt 
                                                 
5   The Treaty and annexed protocols rely on the ESA for the definition of deficit. When the Treaty was signed 
in 1992, and until 1999, the ESA79 version of the system was in place, which allowed government accounts 
to be computed mostly on a cash basis. ESA95 was first implemented in 2000, in the release of fiscal data for 
1999. See Eurostat (2000) and EU Regulations 2516/2000 and 995/2001.  
6  The  debt  rule  demands  that,  if  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  is  above  60  percent,  it  must  be  declining  at  a 
“satisfactory” pace. However, the meaning of “satisfactory” is yet to be defined.  
7  The model is similar in spirit to Buti, Nogueira Martins, and Turrini (2006), but differs in several significant 
respects.     
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but  leave the  Maastricht  deficit  unaffected  (a  “debt-specific”  SFA).  Econometric  estimates 
based  on  such  model  provide  evidence  that  deficit-specific  SFA  tend  to  increase  with  the 
underlying deficit, and debt-specific SFA tend to offset the impact of such an increase on total 
SFA. This suggests not only that opportunistic accounting may have taken place to ensure 
formal compliance with the deficit rule, but also that debt-specific SFA may have reduced the 
visibility of the ensuing deficit-debt discrepancy. 
 
Attention to the quality of statistics has increased in recent years, also in the context of the 
reform  of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  (SGP).  Based  on  case  studies  and  econometric 
evidence, the paper welcomes this development and argues that that detailed analysis of SFA 
components is crucial to the full exploitation of the monitoring synergies arising from the 
presence of two fiscal indicators.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the reconciliation 
account between EMU’s deficit and debt indicators. It discusses how the headline deficit can 
be kept low through increases in some SFA components and how other SFA components can 
partly offset the ensuing negative effects on debt dynamics. Section 3 analyzes large deficit 
revisions in Greece, Italy and Portugal. Section 4 develops a simple model of window dressing, 
which is then used in Section 5 as the basis of an econometric analysis. The empirical evidence 
suggests that, indeed, different SFA components have reduced both reported net borrowing and 
the visibility of deficit-specific window dressing. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The reconciliation account (SFA) 
For  the  purpose  of  EMU  fiscal  rules,  deficit  is  defined  as  the  general  government  net 
borrowing computed on an accrual basis in accordance with ESA95, and debt is defined as 
general  government  gross  financial  liabilities  at  face  value.
8  A  simplified  reconciliation 
account  between  the  change  in  Maastricht  debt  (DB)  and  the  Maastricht  deficit  (D
m)  can 
therefore be written as: 
 
DB º D
m+ CA + FAa – FA s  – VE        (1) 
Where: 
a)  CA is the difference between cash and accrual valuations (the latter is used to compute the 
Maastricht deficit D
m, the former determines the actual financing needs and therefore is 
reflected in changes in liabilities as measured by DB); 
b)  FAa and FAs are, respectively, acquisitions and sales of financial assets (which must be 
added  to  net  borrowing  measured  –  D
m  –  to  obtain  a  measure  of  gross  borrowing, 
consistent with the change in gross liabilities – DB); 
                                                 
8  This is not the debt definition provided by ESA95, but the relevant financial instruments and the reference 
sectors are those specified within that framework.     
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c)  VE (i.e. valuation effects) is a summary measure of SFA arising from changes in the face 
value of outstanding liabilities




Identity (1) suggests three observations concerning the scope for opportunistic accounting: 
a)  underestimation  (overestimation)  of  accrued  expenditure  (revenue)  allows  reporting  a 
lower Maastricht deficit (D
m) but leaves the change in debt (DB) unaffected as it is offset 
by an increase in cash-accrual differences (CA); 
b)  similarly,  the  adoption  of  loose  standards  in  the  identification  of  expenditure/revenue 
reflecting  acquisition/sales  of  financial  assets,  reduces  the  reported  D
m  but  leaves  DB 
unaffected due to the corresponding increase/decrease in FAa/FAs; 
c)  sales of financial assets (FAs) and debt restructuring operations (a component of VE) can be 




a)  a  large  difference  between  DB  and  D
m  should  alert  towards  the  possibility  that  D
m  is 
underestimated; 
b)  a small difference between DB and D
m cannot be taken to exclude an underestimation of D
m 
since  sales  of  assets  and  debt  restructuring  can  be  used  to  offset  inflated  cash-accrual 
differences and net acquisition of financial assets. 
 
This suggests rewriting (1) in order to partition total SFA into two groups. One group includes 
items that can be used to affect the Maastricht deficit but leave the change in debt unaltered (a 
“deficit-specific” SFA, X), the other includes items that can be used to reduce the change in 




m+ X  – Z           (2) 
 
                                                 
9  For example, those due to debt restructuring operations or to fluctuations in the exchange rate affecting the 
value in domestic currency of foreign currency denominated debt. 
10   The face value of a bond is used to compute DB while its issue price measures the financing actually received 
by  the  government  and  therefore  reflects  the  financing  needs  measured  by  the  cash  gross  borrowing 
requirement, i.e. by D
m + CA + FAa – FAs. 
11  Importantly, such operations may leave the government’s net asset position unaffected or even worsen it. In 
this respect, one should also control the extent of one-off measures affecting directly D
m (Milesi-Ferretti, 
2003). There is of course no implication here that privatizations are by definition bad policy. However, if they 
are undertaken with the sole purpose of reducing gross debt – regardless of the economics underlying the 
transaction – then the operations can be questioned. 
12  See also Buti, Nogueira Martins, and Turrini (2006).     
  7 
Mapping identity (1) into identity (2), however, is not a straightforward exercise. First, there 
are items in the reconciliation account that do not belong to either X or Z (this is the case of 
valuation effects arising from fluctuations in the value of foreign currency denominated debt 
and because of bonds issued above/below par).
13 Second, some of the individual items in (1) 
may be affected by attempts at reducing D
m as well as DB (this is the case of asset sales, FAs, 
whose total can be lowered by an opportunistic classification of transactions aimed at lowering 
D
m, and can be increased by privatization programs undertaken to reduce DB).  
 
For the purpose of this paper, we use the following definitions: 
 
                              Z =  PRIV + VE            (3) 
X = CA + FAa  – OFAs 
 
where PRIV indicates revenues from the sale of assets arising in the context of privatization 
programs and OFAs indicates other revenue from the sale of financial assets. 
 
The proposed treatment of VE and FAs reflects data availability constraints and carries some 
costs. First, based on these definitions, Z includes all valuation effects (VE), irrespective of 
whether they can or cannot be controlled by the fiscal authorities. This is likely to introduce 
considerable noise in  Z and may impede the detection of  any systematic pattern in  “debt-
specific” stock-flows. Second, it is implicitly assumed that sales of financial assets different 
from  privatization  do  not  reflect  debt  reduction  motives.  This  may  somewhat  blur  the 
distinction between “deficit-specific” and “debt-specific” SFA components, making it more 
difficult to detect a systematically selective use of SFA items. 
 
Table 1 reports the average values – as a share of GDP – of total, deficit-specific, and debt-
specific SFA, according to the definitions in (3) for the countries which were EU members 
over  1994-2004  (excluding  Luxembourg).  The  table  shows  that  the  discrepancy  between 
changes in debt and deficits has been by no means negligible over the period considered (the 
average for the EU as a whole amounts to 0.6 percent of GDP). The table also highlights a 
much  higher  value  for  the  deficit-specific  SFA  component  (1.0  percent  of  GDP),  and  the 
offsetting role of debt-specific SFA (averaging at 0.3 percent of GDP). 
 
Table 2 reports similar information, but it is based on the original data releases by Greece, 
Italy, and Portugal (i.e. before the revisions which have occurred since 2002). The overall SFA 
averages at 0.9 percent of GDP for the EU countries considered. This is the net result of a 
deficit-specific component of 1.2 percent of GDP, partly offset by the debt-specific component 
(0.3 percent of GDP on average). 
 
                                                 
13  Note, however, that by issuing bonds above par, a government could reduce the change in debt associated 
with a given deficit.      
  8 
 
 
Table 1 - Total SFA and its components (% of GDP) 
deficit-specific SFA (X) debt-specific SFA (Z)  total SFA
Belgium -0.3 0.3 -0.6
Denmark 0.8 0.7 0.1
Germany 0.7 0.0 0.7
Greece 3.2 0.0 3.2
Spain 0.3 -0.3 0.7
France 0.5 0.0 0.5
Ireland 2.0 0.5 1.5
Italy 1.1 0.9 0.2
The Netherlands -0.1 0.3 -0.5
Austria 1.2 0.5 0.7
Portugal 0.9 1.3 -0.3
Finland 1.4 -0.9 2.3
Sweden 1.5 1.0 0.5
United Kingdom 0.4 0.4 0.1
EU average 1.0 0.3 0.6






Table 2 - Total SFA and its components (% of GDP) 
              (average values over 1994-2004, data before revisions occured since 2002) 
deficit-specific SFA (X) debt-specific SFA (Z)  total SFA
Belgium -0.3 0.3 -0.6
Denmark 0.8 0.7 0.1
Germany 0.7 0.0 0.7
Greece 5.0 -0.9 5.9
Spain 0.3 -0.3 0.7
France 0.5 0.0 0.5
Ireland 2.0 0.5 1.5
Italy 1.4 0.7 0.7
The Netherlands -0.1 0.3 -0.5
Austria 1.2 0.5 0.7
Portugal 1.5 1.3 0.1
Finland 1.4 -0.9 2.3
Sweden 1.5 1.0 0.5
United Kingdom 0.4 0.4 0.1
EU average 1.2 0.3 0.9  
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3. Deficit revisions in Italy, Portugal, and Greece  
Evidence  supporting  the  usefulness  of  crosschecking  fiscal  data  is  provided  by  three  case 
studies of significant deficit data revisions. These revisions concerned the 2001 deficit outcome 
in Italy and Portugal and the 2003 deficit outturn in Greece. In all three cases, the initial deficit 
figure was consistent with the forecasts by international organisations. This seems to indicate 




Italy: the 2001 deficit outturn 
In March 2002, the Italian Statistical Office (Istat) released the first statistics concerning the 
2001  net  borrowing.  Back  then,  the  deficit  was  estimated  to  be  1.4  percent  of  GDP.  The 
outcome was very close to the range of forecasts published by international organisations. 
After several revisions, the 2001 deficit is currently estimated to be 3.1 per cent of GDP. 
 
Changes to the 2001 net borrowing figures took place between June 2002 and March 2006. In 
particular, in June 2002 Istat raised its estimate from 1.4 to 1.6 percent of GDP, primarily on 
account of higher health sector expenditure. One month later, Eurostat announced its decision 
on  the  accounting  treatment  for  the  purposes  of  the  Excessive  deficit  procedure  of 
securitisations carried out by governmental authorities. This implied an upward revision of 
Italy’s deficit to 2.2 percent of GDP.  
 
In February 2003, Istat again published a higher figure for the 2001 deficit: 2.6 per cent of 
GDP. This new estimate was due to the availability of more  complete information on the 
different government tiers’ economic accounts.  
 
Two  years later, in  March 2005,  Istat once  more revised upwards the 2001 deficit, to 3.0 
percent  of  GDP,  because  of  the  reclassification  of  capital  transfers  from  the  general 
government to the Ferrovie dello Stato (the state-owned railway company) from financial to 
real transactions. Two months later, in May 2005, the 2001 deficit was estimated to be 3.2 
percent of GDP mainly because of the upward revision of transfers to firms. Finally, in March 
2006, due to a GDP upward revision, the 2001 deficit was indicated to be 3.1 percent of GDP. 
 
The overall revision can be interpreted in terms of the deficit-specific SFA component (X) 
considered in the previous Section: X was initially overestimated. More specifically, the deficit 
revision reflects a reduction of the cash-accrual adjustment by 0.6 percentage points of GDP, 
an increase in the sale of assets by 0.6 points (the reclassification of securitization), and a 
                                                 
14  This Section is a summary and update of the analysis conducted in two earlier papers (Balassone, Franco and 
Zotteri, 2004 and 2006).      
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reduction in acquisitions of financial assets by 0.5 points (mainly, the reclassification of capital 
injections in the railway company). 
 
The decline initially reported for the deficit between 2000 and 2001 (from 1.7 percent to 1.4 
percent of GDP) was in sharp contrast with the dynamics of the change in debt. According to 
the data available in March 2002, the latter rose from 1.6 percent of GDP in 2000 to 3.5 
percent  in  2001.  This  indicator  turned  out  to  be  more  stable  than  ESA95  net  borrowing: 
overall, it was revised upwards by 0.7 percentage points; moreover, revisions took place only 
up to March 2003. 
 
Fig. 1 
Italy: Net Borrowing and Change in Debt 
 
(Millions of euro) 










Net borrowing  Change in debt









Net borrowing  Change in debt
 
 
Figure 1 shows the divergence between the ESA95 deficit and the change in debt as it first 
appeared in March 2002 (Panel A) and as it appears now (Panel B). After the revisions, the 
dynamics  of  the  ESA95  deficit  is  clearly  closer  to  that  of  the  change  in  debt.  The  joint 
examination of the indicators could have provided an early warning of the likely forthcoming 




Portugal: the 2001 deficit outturn 
In March 2002 – in its first Notification about the 2001 fiscal outcomes – Portugal estimated 
the general government deficit to be 2.2 percent of GDP as against 1.5 percent in 2000. At that 
time, the most up-to-date deficit forecasts by international institution were somewhat more 
favourable.  
 
                                                 
15  The Report also included an analysis of the composition of total SFA.      
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Eurostat stated that it was not in a position to certify the Portuguese figures due to, among 
other reasons, the lack of information on capital injections to public corporations – which had 
been  treated  as  acquisition  of  shares  and  other  equities  with  no  effect  on  the  government 
deficit.  Moreover,  Eurostat  stressed  that  –  as  some  of  these  capital  injections  might  be 
reclassified as transfers – the notified deficit was to be considered as provisional and likely to 
be increased. 
 
In the Spring of 2002 a commission headed by the Banco de Portugal and also composed of 
representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the National Statistical Institute was set up with 
the mandate of analysing and updating the government accounts. In September, the figure for 
the 2001 deficit was revised upwards to 4.1 percent of GDP. This revision was due to a number 
of  factors:  new  data  on  the  accounts  of  the  local  authorities;  the  inclusion  in  the  budget 
accounts of some injections of capital into publicly-owned companies; changes to the methods 
used  to  account  for  expenditure  carryovers  and  revenue  connected  with  the  EU  structural 
funds; and the expiration of a derogation regarding the methods of recording tax and social 
contribution receipts accruing in the year. 
 
Between September 2002 and September 2004 the deficit was slightly revised upwards twice, 
to 4.4 percent of GDP. In September 2004, Eurostat stressed that there were still ongoing 
discussions with the Portuguese authorities concerning the consistency between accrual and 
cash data for the period 2001-04. One year later, the 2001 deficit-to-GDP ratio was revised 
downwards to 4.2 because of an upward revision of GDP. At that time, Eurostat said that it 
intended to clarify reported cases of capital injections undertaken between 2001 and 2004 by 
various governments, including Portugal. At present, according to the European Commission 
2006 Spring Forecasts, the Portuguese 2001 deficit is estimated to be 4.3 per cent of GDP. 
Therefore, the overall revision with respect to the original data release amounts to 2.1 percent 
of GDP. 
 
The initially reported increase in the deficit between 2000 and 2001 (from 1.5 to 2.2 percent of 
GDP) was markedly smaller than the one observed for the change in debt. The latter rose from 
2.5 percent of GDP in 2000 to 5.5 percent in 2001. Over time, the 2001 change in debt was 
revised  only  slightly  and  mostly  because  of  GDP  revisions.  According  to  the  most  recent 
European Commission data – the change in debt increased from 2.4 in 2000 to 5.3 in 2001. 
Figure 2.A shows the initial divergence between ESA95 deficit and the change in debt. Figure 
2.B shows the same variables after the revisions.     
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Fig. 2 
Portugal: Net Borrowing and Change in Debt 
(Millions of euro) 







Net borrowing  Change in debt 







Net borrowing  Change in debt 
 
          
Greece: the 2003 deficit outturn 
At the beginning of March 2004, in its first Notification of the 2003 fiscal outcome, Greece 
estimated the general government deficit at 1.7 percent of GDP, as against 1.4 percent in 2002. 
At that time, the most up-to-date forecasts by international institutions were broadly in line 
with the data notified by Greece. After several revisions, the 2003 deficit is currently estimated 
to be 5.8 percent of GDP. 
 
Revisions occurred between March 2004 and March 2006. Indeed, already by the end of March 
2004 Greece sent updated data to the European Commission, revising upwards the 2003 deficit 
to 3.0 percent of GDP. In April, in publishing the Spring Forecasts, the Commission took into 
account the latter Notification. It stressed that  “the data for 2003 are not  yet validated by 
Eurostat and do not therefore provide a reliable basis for assessing the budgetary situation at 
this stage”. The Commission also noted that “[a] fact-finding mission is being prepared for the 
end of April in order to have more information about the budgetary situation in this country 
and decide on steps to be taken”. 
 
At the beginning of May, following an additional Notification, Eurostat verified that in 2003 
the general government deficit was 3.2 percent of GDP. In September, the deficit and debt 
figures for the years 2000-03 were significantly revised. In particular, the 2003 deficit was 
estimated at 4.6 percent of GDP and the 2003 debt was indicated at 109.9 percent of GDP. 
 
Both in the March 2005 Notification and in the September 2005 one, Greece revised the 2003 
deficit upwards by more than half a percentage point of GDP (to 5.2 and 5.7, respectively). In 
March 2006 the 2003 deficit was estimated to be 5.8 per cent of GDP. 
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Fig. 3 
Greece: Net Borrowing and Change in Debt 
(Millions of euro) 















Net borrowing  Change in debt 
 
 
As  to the  deficit,  the  overall  revisions were  essentially  due  to: lower  tax  revenue  (mainly 
VAT);  lower  payments  received  from  EU  institutions  in  the  context  of  structural  funds 
programmes;  the  reclassification,  as  a  financial  transaction,  of  a payment  from  the  Saving 
Postal Bank to government; upward revisions of military expenditure and of interest payments; 
lower than expected surpluses of social security funds; and incorrect recording of hospitals’ 
expenditure.  
 
With reference to the debt, the revisions were due to the previous underestimation of bonds 
with capitalised interests and to the overestimation of consolidating assets of social security.  
 
The initially  reported  increase  in  deficit  between 2002  and  2003  (from  1.4 percent to  1.7 
percent of GDP) was in line with that observed for the change in debt, the latter rising from 5.6 
percent of GDP in 2002 to 5.9 percent in 2003. However, the level of the two indicators was 
markedly different (Figure 3.A). Figure 3.B shows how revisions have completely cancelled 
the 2003 discrepancy and significantly reduced those for previous years. 
 
 
4. Fiscal rules and window dressing: a simple model 
An econometric analysis of SFA in EU member countries was first provided by von Hagen and 
Wolff  (2004).  The  paper  refers  to  the  theoretical framework developed  in  von  Hagen  and 
Harden  (1995,  1996)  and  Milesi-Ferretti  (2003),  where  governments  have  an  incentive  to 
circumvent fiscal rules by hiding the budgetary implications of fiscal policies in less visible 
accounting  items  (that  is,  in  the  SFA).  The  likelihood  of  this  type  of  window  dressing 
decreases with the costs associated with detection. The authors argue that binding deficit rules 
were introduced only with the start up of the European Economic Monetary Union (EMU) – 
i.e. the SGP – and therefore focus their analysis on differences in the correlation between 
reported deficits and SFA before and after EMU. They find no such correlation before 1998,     
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but  a  negative  one  (large  and  significant)  thereafter,  suggesting  that  SFA  were  in  fact 
substituting for other transactions which would have had an impact on deficits. 
 
Buti, Nogueira Martins, and Turrini (2006) develop a model where total SFA is split into two 
components (one that can be used to reduce reported deficits and the other to impact debt 
figures). In this way they can separately analyze the interaction between each of the Maastricht 
fiscal rules and window dressing. They assume that governments minimize a quadratic loss 
function whose arguments are the deviation of output from its optimal level (influenced by the 
“true” deficit), deviations of reported deficit and debt from the respective fiscal rule, and the 
size of window dressing. The model suggests that both the deficit-specific and the debt-specific 
components of SFA are positively related to the “true deficit”, and that only the debt-specific 
component also depends on the debt level (though the sign of the relation is ambiguous ex 
ante). The empirical results are partly in line with the theoretical predictions of the model.
16 
Notably, the authors find that the introduction of the SGP had an (increasing) impact on the 
deficit-specific component of the SFA, but none on the debt-specific component. 
 
In  this  section,  following  Buti  et  al.  (2006)  we  provide  separate  econometric  analysis  of 
deficit-specific and debt-specific SFA components. However, we refer to a different model as 
the basis for our estimating equations. We assume that government i at time t derives utility 
(Uit) from running a primary deficit (Pit): Uit=U(Pit). This can be justified either by assuming 
that governments are short sighted and only care about the short-term output gains that can be 
attained through higher  deficits, or by reference to the political  gain directly attainable by 
increasing transfers targeted to specific groups. In either case, the assumption is consistent with 
the rationale for having a fiscal rule specifying a maximum threshold for the deficit, suggesting 
the need to counteract an asymmetric deficit bias.
17 In what follows, lower-case letters are used 
to indicate that variables are considered as ratios to GDP. 
 
Governments’ utility maximization is constrained by compliance with Maastricht’s debt and 
deficit rules. The debt rule mandates that the debt-to-GDP ratio (bit) must be lower than 60 
percent  and,  if  higher  than such  threshold  to  begin  with,  it must  be  declining  towards 60 
percent at a satisfactory pace. As we have noted earlier, the “satisfactory pace” has never been 
defined, therefore we model this rule as requiring: 
 
(4)   Dbit = pit + ritbit-1 – yitbit-1 – zit ≤ Wit  where Wit=0 if bit-1>60, Wit=60–bit-1 if bit-1<60 
                                                 
16  The  authors  find  no  statistically  significant  relationship  between  the  two  components  of  SFA  and  “true 
deficits”. They find evidence of a positive relationship between reported deficits and deficit-specific SFA and 
of a negative relationship between reported deficits and debt-specific SFA. Only debt-specific SFA are found 
to be affected (negatively) by the debt level.   
17  The quadratic loss function adopted in Buti et al. (2006) is symmetric in deviations from the optimal real 
output growth where real output growth depends linearly on the “true deficit”.     
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i.e.  the  change  in  the  ratio  of  debt  to  GDP  (Dbit)  –  as  determined  by  the  “true  deficit” 
(dit=pit+ritbit-1  where rit is the average interest rate on government debt and ritbit-1 indicates the 
corresponding interest payments), the reducing effect of output growth (yitbit-1, where yit is the 
growth rate of output), and the debt-specific SFA (zit) – must be negative if bit-1 is above 60 
percent to start with.
18 The change in the debt ratio can be positive if bit-1<60 to start with, but 
it cannot bring bit above 60 percent.
19 
 
The deficit rule requires that reported deficits (dit
m) be lower than 3 percent of GDP. Similarly 
to what happens for the debt ratio, if the reported deficit ratio is above 3 percent to start with, a 
gradual reduction is expected. Without loss of generality, and by analogy with the debt rule, we 
assume that in this case the reported deficit, as a minimum, must not increase further. The 
deficit rule is therefore modelled as: 
 
(5)   dit
m = dit – xit = pit + ritbit-1 – xit ≤ Hit    where Hit=3 if dit-1
m<3, Hit=dit
m  if dit-1
m>3 
 
where xit denotes the deficit-specific SFA component.
20  
 
We assume that xit and zit only arise because of opportunistic accounting aimed at ensuring 
formal compliance with the rules. Therefore, we also impose two non-negativity conditions on 
xit and zit (xit≥0 and zit≥0). 
 
Finally, we assume that running a primary deficit and using deficit and debt-specific SFA carry 
a cost Cit=C(pit, xit, zit). Following Buti et al. (2006) the costs can be thought of as deriving 
from suboptimal allocation of resources (higher pit, xit and zit make suboptimality more likely) 
and from the risk of being caught (higher xit and zit are more visible). 
 
                                                 
18    With respect to the analysis in Section 2, scaling the variables by GDP requires the consideration of the 
reducing  effect  exerted  by  output  growth  on  the  debt  ratio.  In  discrete-time  models  equation  (4)  is  an 
approximation: the exact specification would have both yitbit-1 and ritbit-1 divided by (1+yit).
 
19  In this way we explicitly model the constraint also for countries where bit-1<60 (Buti et al., 2006, assume zit=0 
for bit-1<60).  
20  This formulation allows differentiating the constraints applying to countries with reported deficits above and 
below 3 percent of GDP, rather than use dummy variables at the estimation stage.     
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In sum, the maximization problem facing fiscal authorities can be described as follows:
21 
  
(6)  Maxp,x,z   U(pit) – C(pit, xit, zit) 
s.t.  pit + ritbit-1 – yitbit-1 – zit ≤ Wit        where Wit=0 if bit-1>60, Wit=60–bit-1 if bit-1<60 
    pit + ritbit-1 – xit ≤ Hit          where Hit=3 if dit-1
m<3, Hit=dit
m  if dit-1
m>3 
    – xit ≤ 0 
    – zit ≤ 0 
 
whose Lagrangean is: 
 
(7)   U(.) – C(.) – l1[pit + ritbit-1–yitbit-1–zit–Wit] – l2[pit+ritbit-1–xit–Hit] – l3[–xit] – l4[–zit] 
 
With first order conditions: 
(8a)   U’ – Cp – l1 – l2  = 0 
(8b)   – Cx + l2  + l3  = 0 
(8c)   – Cz + l1  + l4  = 0 
(8d)   l1 ≥ 0    pit+r itb it-1–y itb it-1–z it–Wit≤0    l1[pit+r itb it-1–y itb it-1–z it–Wit]=0 
(8e)   l2 ≥ 0    pit+ritbit-1–xit–Hit ≤ 0      l2 [pit+ritbit-1–xit–Hit] = 0 
(8f)  l3 ≥ 0    – xit ≤0         l3[xit]=0 
(8g)  l4 ≥ 0    – z it ≤0         l4[z it]=0 
 
When Maastricht’s debt and deficit rules are not binding (i.e. l1, l2  = 0), from (8b) and (8c) it 
follows that l3, l4  > 0 (since Cx, Cz > 0) and therefore, from (8f) and (8g), we have that xit and 




(9)   zit = pit + ritbit-1 – yitbit-1 –Wit 
(10)  xit = pit + ritbit-1 – Hit 
 
In this simple model x and z represent pure window dressing variables. However, in the real 
world stock-flow adjustment (SFA) arise for entirely legitimate reasons and its components 
(i.e. xit and zit) can also be negative (e.g. cash-accrual differences can be negative as well as 
positive; negative  valuation  effects  can  outweigh  privatisation  receipts).  Therefore,  we  can 
only use equations (9) and (10) to help selecting the drivers of opportunistic accounting and 
check  empirically  whether  they  explain  the  observed  behaviour  of  actual  stock-flow 
components. 
                                                 
21   The standard assumptions on U(.) and C(.) ensure that the maximisation problem is well defined. 
22  Obviously, possible solutions include cases where only one of the two fiscal rules is binding (xit = 0, z it>0 and 
xit> 0, zit=0).     
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5. The empirical analysis 
We use panel data for the fifteen countries which were EU members over 1994-2004. Deficit-
specific  SFA  are  obtained  from  the  Buti  et  al.  (2006)  dataset  as  the  sum  of  cash-accrual 
differences and of net acquisitions of financial assets, excluding privatization, following the 
discussion in Section 2. The “true deficit” is obtained by summing the deficit-specific SFA to 
deficit data used in the context of the Excessive deficit procedure (EDP) as reported in the 
AMECO database. The “growth effect” is computed using data from the AMECO database. 
Finally, and again in line with the discussion in Section 2, debt-specific SFA are obtained 
residually by subtracting from total SFA the deficit-specific SFA component and the growth 
effect. 
 
As a first step, in order to test the restrictions implicit in equation (9) and (10) (i.e. that the 
growth  effect  only  matters  for  the  debt-specific  SFA  and  that  Hit  and  Wit  only  affect  one 
component of SFA, respectively x and z), we estimate the following two regressions: 
 
(11)   zit = a0  + a1 dit + a2 yitbit-1 + a3 Wit + a 4 Hit + St a t DUt + eit  
(12)   xit = b0  + b 1 dit + b2 yitbit-1 + b3 Wit + b4 Hit + St b t DUt + nit  
 
Where DUt are time-dummy variables included to account for time-specific common shocks.  
 
Since  xit,  zit,  and  pit  (and  therefore  dit)  are  simultaneously  determined,  we  report  results 
obtained using two stage least squares with country fixed effects (we instrument d and H with 
their  lagged  values).  We  run  the  test  on  two  datasets:  one  including  the  most  recent  data 
releases, the other one based on the values first reported by Greece, Italy, and Portugal over the 
period 1998-2004 (that is data published before the statistical revisions discussed in Section 3). 
 
For both samples the model restrictions are accepted (Table 3 and Table 4, Columns 1 and 3). 
None  of  the  time  dummies  is  significant  in  equation  (11).  All  of  them  are  significant  in 
equation (12), but dropping them does not affect sign and significance of the other relevant 
parameters (Columns 5 in Tables 3 and 4).
23 
 
Therefore, we estimate the following equations: 
 
(13)   zit = a0  + a1 dit + a2 yitbit-1 + a3 Wit +  eit  
(14)   xit = b0  + b 1 dit + b4 Hit + St b t DUt + nit  
 
                                                 
23  In the Tables only results of the joint-significance test are reported.     
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From the signs in (9) and (10), we expect: 
 
(a)   a1 > 0 ;    a2 , a3 < 0  
(b)   b1 > 0 ;    b4 < 0 
 
We  expect  both  types  of  SFA  to  be  positively  related  to  the  level  of  the  “true deficit” 
(a1, b 1 > 0): the higher the “true deficit”, the higher the x and z values required for formal 
compliance with the rules (see also Buti et al., 2006). 
 
The  debt  level  plays  no  direct  role,  and  it  only  affects  the  debt-specific  SFA  through  the 
“growth effect” (i.e. the reduction of the debt ratio determined by GDP growth, which is larger 
the larger the debt). The use of z to keep debt dynamics under control becomes less necessary 
when the growth impact is higher, hence the negative sign expected for a2. 
 
The constraints determined by the deficit and debt fiscal rules enter directly the corresponding 
estimating  equations.  We  expect  the  levels  of  z  and  x  to  be  negatively  correlated  with, 
respectively,  the  maximum  allowed  change  in  debt  and  the  maximum  allowed  deficit 
(a3, b 4 < 0). In other words, the more binding the fiscal rule the higher the incentives to resort 
to window dressing. 
 
The estimation results are in line with expectations from the model (Columns 2 and 4 of Tables 
3  and  4).  All  coefficients  are  correctly  signed,  statistically  significant  and  exerting 
quantitatively large effects on the dependent variables. Using the original data releases for 
Greece, Italy, and Portugal induces an improvement in the regression fit for the deficit-specific 
equation, but not for the debt-specific one, possibly reflecting the limited extent of revisions to 
changes  in  debt  compared  to  revisions  in  deficits  (Columns  2  and  4  of  Tables  3  and  4). 
Estimates are robust to sample selection: results are not affected by the exclusion of Italy, 
Greece and Portugal nor is there a significant difference between results for the EU15 and 
those for the euro area.  
 
The deficit-specific SFA is positively correlated with the “true deficit”. For each one percent of 
GDP increase in the true deficit there is an estimated 0.6 percent of GDP increase in deficit-
specific SFA. The deficit-specific SFA is also negatively correlated with the maximum allowed 
deficit (H). The increase in deficit-specific SFA associated with a one percent of GDP decrease 
in the allowed maximum deficit is estimated at 0.25 percent of GDP, using the data set which 
includes recent revisions to data for Greece, Italy, and Portugal, and to 0.5 percent, excluding 
such revisions. 
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Table 3 - Determinants of deficit and debt SFA: latest releases (1)
Dependent Variable
Constant 0.436 1.983 ** -2.389 * -1.898 * 2.155 **
0.700 0.000 0.018 0.028 0.000
"True Deficit" 0.436 ** 0.300 ** 0.586 ** 0.569 ** 0.427 **
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Growth Effect -0.270 * -0.379 ** 0.037
0.056 0.001 0.771
Debt rule (W) -0.200 ** -0.189 ** 0.054
0.000 0.000 0.097
Deficit rule (H) -0.129 -0.251 * -0.243 * -0.597 **
0.365 0.049 0.047 0.000
Time dummies (2) 0.085 0.000 0.000
R2:  within 0.512 0.376 0.571 0.558 0.308
        between 0.457 0.436 0.376 0.312 0.183
        overall 0.251 0.204 0.458 0.416 0.255
(1) 2SLS, fixed effects. P-values in italics. *, ** indicate coefficient significance at the 95% and 99%
      level, respectively. Data as in the latest releases available.
(2) P-values for the joint-significance test.










Table 4 - Determinants of deficit and debt SFA: initial releases (1)
Dependent Variable
Constant -0.856 1.564 ** -0.605 -0.570 3.172 **
0.500 0.010 0.557 0.513 0.000
"True Deficit" 0.385 ** 0.300 ** 0.613 ** 0.601 ** 0.472 **
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Growth Effect -0.202 -0.302 * -0.048
0.202 0.017 0.708
Debt rule (W) -0.192 ** -0.176 ** 0.029
0.000 0.000 0.405
Deficit rule (H) 0.072 -0.486 ** -0.502 ** -0.836 **
0.650 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time dummies (2) 0.088 0.000 0.000
R2:  within 0.441 0.327 0.628 0.623 0.388
        between 0.319 0.351 0.422 0.426 0.219
        overall 0.173 0.164 0.537 0.538 0.317
(1) 2SLS, fixed effects. P-values in italics. *, ** indicate coefficient significance at the 95% and 99%
      level, respectively. 1998-2004 data for Greece, Italy, and Portugal are those from first official releases.
(2) P-values for the joint-significance test.
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The debt-specific SFA is positively correlated with the “true deficit”. For each one percent of 
GDP increase in the true deficit, there is an increase by about 0.3 percent of GDP in debt-
specific SFA, offsetting half of the corresponding estimated increase in deficit-specific SFA. 
The debt-specific SFA is negatively correlated with the “growth effect”. For each one percent 
of GDP increase in the growth effect, there is a 0.30-0.38 percent of GDP decrease in debt-
specific SFA. Finally, the debt SFA is also negatively correlated with the maximum allowed 
change in debt (W). For each one percent of GDP increase in the allowed maximum change in 




The reliability of EMU’s fiscal indicators has been questioned by recent episodes of large 
upward deficit revisions. This paper points out that EMU’s deficit indicator is particularly 
fragile in two respects: the identification of transactions in financial assets and the assessment 
of accrued revenue and expenditure. It argues that margins for window dressing mainly arise 
from these two weak spots. 
 
Even the simple comparison between deficit and change in debt can help early detection of 
inconsistencies  in  fiscal  data.  Evidence  from  three  case  studies  of  significant  deficit  data 
revision suggests the usefulness of crosschecks between deficit and changes in gross debt to 
reduce the scope for window dressing. 
 
Changes in general government debt were much larger than initial deficit figures in Greece, 
Italy, and Portugal, before the large upward deficit revisions experienced in recent years. In 
Italy, the revision process was gradual and lasted four years. Although the initial discrepancy 
between the change in debt and the deficit was more than 2 percent of GDP, the highest annual 
revision  amounted  to  only  0.8  points.  In  Greece,  a  large  discrepancy  between  the  two 
indicators  was  present  for several  years  before  the process  of  statistical revisions  abruptly 
started in 2004.  
 
Nevertheless, since different items in the reconciliation account between deficit and change in 
debt  can  offset  each  other,  consistency  checks  must  go  deeper  than  the  overall  difference 
between the two indicators. Italy provides an interesting example. In 2001 total SFA amounted 
to 4.3 percent of GDP, as against “only” 1.2 percent in 2000. However, deficit-specific SFA 
were higher in 2000 than in 2001 (3.4 vs. 3.0 percent of GDP), and the increase in total SFA in 
2001 reflected the decline in the offsetting debt-specific SFA. 
 
Econometric estimates discussed in Section 5 provide evidence that deficit-specific SFA tend 
to increase with the underlying deficit and debt-specific SFA tend to offset the impact on total 
SFA  of  such  an  increase.  This  suggests  not  only  that  window  dressing  may  have  helped     
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ensuring formal compliance with the deficit rule, but also that debt-specific SFA may have 
made the ensuing deficit-debt discrepancy less visible. 
 
Attention to the quality of statistics has increased in recent years also in the context of the 
reform of the SGP. Since 2004, Notifications include more detailed information, which now 
refer  to  the  various  sub-sectors  of  the  general  government.  In  addition,  some  steps  have 
recently been taken to improve statistical governance at the EU and national level. 
 
The Regulation concerning the statistics used for the Excessive deficit procedure has been 
amended. The role of Eurostat as the statistical authority in the context of the Excessive deficit 
procedure  has  been  reinforced  by  introducing  formal  requirements  of  completeness  and 
internal consistency of fiscal data reported to the Commission and by disciplining Eurostat’s 
interaction with member states through “dialogue” and “methodological” visits. In order to 
improve  transparency  and  accountability  of  national  statistical  authorities,  the  Regulation 
mandates the public availability of data reported by member states as well as of inventories 
describing  the  methods,  procedures  and  sources  used  by  member  states,  and  requires  the 
publication by Eurostat of regular reports on the quality of data. 
 
To bolster the operational capacity of the Commission, Eurostat has conducted an internal 
redeployment of staff in order to reinforce the activities linked to the validation of economic 
and fiscal accounts and created a dedicated unit. 
 
Finally, the directors of national statistical institute and Eurostat adopted a European Statistics 
Code  of  Practice,  defining  standards  for  the  independence  of  the  national  and  community 
statistical authorities. The Code lists a set of indicators to be used to review the implementation 
of the Code itself. The Commission is setting up a reporting system to monitor adherence to 
the Code of Practice by the national statistical authorities and Eurostat. 
 
The  analysis  of  SFA  along  the  breakdown  suggested  in  the  paper  may  enhance  the 
effectiveness of these reform efforts. To this end, the reconciliation account between deficit 
and  change  in  debt  reported  in  the  Notifications  should  identify  all  financial  assets  and 
therefore  there  should  be  no  residual  item  labelled  as  “other  assets”.  Moreover,  national 
authorities should routinely provide justification for cash-accrual differences in annual data for 
individual accounting items. In due time member states should also be requested to provide a 
full set of government accounts covering both deficit formation and its financing. Such set of 
accounts should include both cash and accrual figures. 
 
Given the unavoidable information asymmetry between the community and member states, 
ensuring the independence of the national statistical institutions is crucial. This is not just an 
issue of enforcement of fiscal rules; it is an issue of accountability to the public and of good 
management of public resources.     
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